Appeasement - Iraq’s Tangled Skein

Every time I hear and see Madeline Albright on the TV, I just have to laugh out loud! I cannot believe that her cute stories are taken for great diplomacy! Everyone in the Clinton’s Camp Runamuk thinks they had the tiger by the tail when it comes to Hamas, North Korea, China, and yes, Iraq. Yet their brand of appeasement actually got them nothing but sneers, the bombing of the World Trade Center (the first time) and the USS Cole, and machinations behind their backs that proves they were lost.

Want some proof? Keep on readin’ folks!

I found a little gem, an off-handed remark, hidden deep within the Foreign Military Studies Office, Joint Reserve Intelligence Center - Operation Iraqi Freedom Documents. Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz are talking about the situation in the UN Security Council around Iraq’s hiding information about their chemical and biological weapons program. As they are sizing up the alliances in the Security Council, Tariq Aziz makes the following comment regarding the US, Argentina, and Madeline Albright:

The Ambassador of Chile appears to be an educated, wonderful person according to his representation. According to my observation, he is fair, imperial and has modern ideas and ahhh … if you will allow me to say, unlike the dog, the Argentinean, who used to be Albright’s servant.

Now, if I were the Ambassador from Argentina, and I were called, “Albright’s servant”, I think I’d be a bit tweaked. You? I mean, that there is some “head buttin’ fuel” wouldn’t you say?

This file store is chock full of amazing insight regarding Iraq’s political process. The way that Saddam’s team sized up their alliances, paid for some, negotiated some to stronger bonds, and ignored some. Obviously, those having tighter ties with the US and Britain were ignored or hopefully played into a tighter corner. Let me drop some comments on ya:

Tariq Aziz to Saddam on South Korea

TARIQ ‘AZIZ: … the meetings were good in general [ INTERRUPTED]
SADDAM: Except Korea
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: South Korea … The Ambassador of South Korea, we know each other, came and told me, I am here to visit you and to visit Baghdad. He appears to be one of the people who keep up with the bilateral relations and he said that we have an interest in Iraq and lifting the sanctions off Iraq and he said we want to buy oil from you. From the beginning, he has been supporting a company that is part of the Oil Ministry and he said, we are ready to pay you a down payment of $50 million dollars if you sign this contract … [INTERRUPTED]
MV ?: A Hundred Sir …
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: It is a hundred now! My information is outdated. Anyway, the possibility of this country being concerned about Iraq and lifting the sanctions, is because they have an interest in it [Iraq]. Ultimately, we can reverse the situation.

Tariq Aziz to Saddam on Eqypt

TARIQ ‘AZIZ: Sir, the new assembly for the Security Council next year, is clearly better than the current assembly is. I mean, Egypt will enter [the assembly], they report with us and you know, your Excellency, Egypt’s politics are much better. Their Ambassador, Nabeel Al-Arabi, is truly a good man, I mean, in the midst of the crisis, he used to come over and visit me years ago, for example, at my residence. By the way, he is also the brother-in-law of Hikeel, they are relatives and friends, I mean, and his demeanor as a human is good. I mean, his staff came over and they met … Dr. ‘Amir has told me that they all arrived, sat and prepared themselves to negotiate, which means that they are taking the issues very seriously, in a helpful way. Al-Arabi is the new replacement.

Tariq Aziz to Saddam on Guinea Bissau

TARIQ ‘AZIZ: When Guinea Bissau arrived, they said, “we are among the people who honor our relation with Iraq, and we remember when you helped us in our time of need”. When I asked them if they have close ties with France, their reply was yes.

Tariq Aziz to Saddam on France

TARIQ ‘AZIZ: After the General Assembly, when meeting with the French Prime Minister in private, I asked him, “how is your relation with Guinea Bissau?” He replied, “very good”. Thereafter, I told him, “I would like you to take care of that … that is to say, for them to take our side. Therefore, he promises to do just that. We are expecting the atmosphere in the Security Council to change relatively from last year, to our advantage, especially if we achieve greater progress with Ekeus’s file. The French, was reserved [firm] in regards to Ekeus or to the issue of Resolution 986, that is to say, he has a firm attitude. He told me, “when you go to Paris you can discuss the issues”. Thereafter, when I arrived in Paris, two days before the official meeting, I observed through my discussion with their Ambassador and [UNINTELLIGIBLE] which they are our close friends from the French Foreign Ministry, that the atmosphere in France is firm, that is to say, it is firm with us … I told my friend, which is the person who we communicate through, to setup a secret meeting with Jacques Chirac, so we finish … [INTERRUPTED] … They said that it could be difficult. I told them to talk to him and see, at any rate, if he could not see me, let us talk on the phone … By God, the next day he contacted me and said, I am coming to see you right now, ahhh … meaning, I am on my way right now. He brought a phone with him when he came. However, Sir, this happened because of the stipulations on us to …
SADDAM: [Yes]
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: Your Excellency, I must tell you this to complete the picture, he brought the phone with him and I talked with the President [Jacques Chirac] At the beginning, he started by saying, I want to help you. You are … [INTERRUPTED] Truthfully, I told him in so many words ahhh … what these issues require and what we are now asking. I also told him that we have not met for eleven months; we need to meet so we can provide you with information about Ekeus. He [Ekeus] will not present his report unless you apply pressure against the American pressure, which is the past Italian pressure. I explained other points to him and honestly, without hesitation, he said, “I will give instructions to the Foreign Ministry now to be completely open with you and to exchange and analyze the information, we will help you. We will call to give instructions to our Ambassador in New York to work in complete coordination with you in regards to this specific issue”. When I met with the Prime Minister on the evening of the next day, after my meeting with the Foreign Minister, during the private interview, he said, … I said, I ahhh … I mean, this issue was … I mean, when I met with the Foreign Minister, he was excited, I mean, not bad … [Laughing] … Foreign Minister? This is what we need from you, to pressure Ekeus, scrutinize him, and ask him when he will be finished and to tell him that this is what Iraq has provided, also for your Ambassador in New York to do whatever he is able to do. He told me yes, especially at the time when the Foreign Relations are warm, and the leadership is cold. Now it is the opposite, the situation has been reversed, the leadership is warm, and the Foreign Relations are cold, however, he told me that this has been solved. Chirac met with me today and told me to take the procedures and tell the Minister and the Ambassador and assure them that this issue has been solved. Therefore, the man was sure of his promise over the phone and put the Prime Minister in charge of giving the instructions. The Foreign Minister was friendly and serious at the meeting. We know the Minister, we met him before, however, we reached a level of understanding and he followed the instructions. I mean, at the end, when I was leaving, he assured me of his support, encouraged me, and said, if you are able, even by phone, call me and inform me if anything should happen. I mean, he encourages quick communications. Therefore, if they did not have the will for teamwork and cooperation, I believe, after my visit to Paris, the French position has been restored.

Tariq Aziz to Saddam on Russia

TARIQ ‘AZIZ: The Russian position remains the same, it is a generous position, I mean, and I have not seen hesitation or coldness in all the issues that we have discussed between him and me, at all. He welcomed and greeted comrade ‘Amir Al-Sa’di. They paid attention to our information that … [INTERRUPTED]
SADDAM: He does not have a position change. Meaning? …
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: Negative.
SADDAM: Are you meaning that he does not have a negative change?
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: Yes.
SADDAM: Do you mean that he was positive?
TARIQ ‘AZIZ: Positive.
SADDAM: Hmmm [good]

And, speaking of Russia, in another file the Security Council issue and Russia gets pretty intense. In a conversation between Saddam and Lt. General ‘Amir, I found this teensy-weensy little bit of, graft:

LT GENERAL ‘AMIR: Sir, truthfully now [UNINTELLIGIBLE] we have put a defense plan in place and your Excellency was aware of the full picture, where the confidence of the success level is seventy percent and fifty percent, depending on the UN paragraphs. Truthfully, we have worked on it [the plan], but now sir, our effort is solely focused on the subject of the Biological Program. In addition there is a special team of inspectors in which all of their efforts are now concentrated on the Biological Program and the passing time during these few weeks has given them the chance to collect and examine the information. I mean, are we neglecting here …? [INTERRUPTED]
SADDAM: Are you talking about the Biological Program or are you talking [rambling] about another subject?
LT GENERAL ‘AMIR: No sir … sorry, it is not that, if I may say?
SADDAM: Yes.
LT GENERAL ‘AMIR: There are grounds for that, but there are no credible grounds left for the Chemical Program and missiles. However, there are grounds for the Biological Program. Sir … one could be suspicious of it [the Biological Program] if we concentrate on it [UNINTELLIGIBLE] and the trafficking effort and dodging everything in regards to it. Therefore … if one does not have anything or have anything left, for example, one should concentrate on their efforts to achieve results. Now, there is a strong ground for achievement on the subject of the Biological Program. Now, sir, the subject of the Biological Program has become a subject that was adopted by [UNINTELLIGIBLE] I mean I am sorry to say that we are responsible for this subject, I mean, we want to succeed. We have succeeded in a few of the UN paragraphs, we have won Russia, ahhh … we have convinced Russia by way of generous accounts [payoffs] in which, you remember how and why it happened … [INTERRUPTED]
SADDAM: Have you asked the Russians if they have any new information?
LT GENERAL ‘AMIR: Yes sir, I will answer that now sir … God bless you and keep you … The only hope we have in our present dilemma, is to extract the technical event to prevent the implementation of UN paragraph 22, I mean, [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. Sir, getting back to the subject of the difficulties that your Excellency has mentioned, I mean, without exaggeration it is consuming us day and night, I mean … it is choking and disturbing us and if we are late for our main work, it could be … Sir, this subject, I mean, it is causing us an effect and a cost … cost. Such a possibility could result in a positive outcome with a high percentage … not bad … it could be seventy or eighty percent. Sir, we must sit down with your Excellency and maybe we will be able to calculate and organize this effort. However sir, without doing this, the possibility to succeed in UN paragraph 22 will be zero and this is what they would like to see happen.

Did ya catch that, the bit about a payoff?

Uh-huh, the reason ALL these documents are not being released is the pure embarrassment that will befall all those that have either paid Saddam or were paid by Saddam. The alliances are thick and the UN is not the place to settle chemical and bilogical weapons issues with Iraq.

I’m still searching these archives for information on transportation of weapons out of Iraq. I have, however, found lots of great stuff regarding biological and chemical weapons development from 1995 to 2003. And, all roads are leading to Iran, I gotta tell ya …

FMSO OIF REFERENCE MATERIAL

1. ISGQ-2003-M0004694-JCOA-HT.pdf

2. ISGQ-2003-M0004667-JCOA-HT.pdf

Stand-To! Carries Us Again! HOOAH!

TAGS: , , , , ,

3 Responses to “Appeasement - Iraq’s Tangled Skein”

  1. Buck Says:

    Interesting stuff, Steve. Thanks for the detective work…ya done good!

  2. Fix4RSO Says:

    Thanks, Buck.

    I’ve been going through about 200+ PDF docs looking for stuff we have not seen already. Takes time, but there are some AMAZING gems … truly!

  3. Fix 4 RSO » Blog Archive » Yellow Cake with French Frosting Says:

    […] I’ve posted before, and this is only one look into the fistula that is the GWOT (Global War on Terror), how Iraq was pushing very hard to work closely with France. In this FMSO doc, it is blatant and clear just what was a-foot (take a step with me, here - pun intended): Tariq Aziz to Saddam on France TARIQ ‘AZIZ: After the General Assembly, when meeting with the French Prime Minister in private, I asked him, “how is your relation with Guinea Bissau?” He replied, “very good”. Thereafter, I told him, “I would like you to take care of that … that is to say, for them to take our side. Therefore, he promises to do just that. We are expecting the atmosphere in the Security Council to change relatively from last year, to our advantage, especially if we achieve greater progress with Ekeus’s file. The French, was reserved [firm] in regards to Ekeus or to the issue of Resolution 986, that is to say, he has a firm attitude. He told me, “when you go to Paris you can discuss the issues”. Thereafter, when I arrived in Paris, two days before the official meeting, I observed through my discussion with their Ambassador and [UNINTELLIGIBLE] which they are our close friends from the French Foreign Ministry, that the atmosphere in France is firm, that is to say, it is firm with us … I told my friend, which is the person who we communicate through, to setup a secret meeting with Jacques Chirac, so we finish … [INTERRUPTED] … They said that it could be difficult. I told them to talk to him and see, at any rate, if he could not see me, let us talk on the phone … By God, the next day he contacted me and said, I am coming to see you right now, ahhh … meaning, I am on my way right now. He brought a phone with him when he came. However, Sir, this happened because of the stipulations on us to … SADDAM: [Yes] TARIQ ‘AZIZ: … [INTERRUPTED] Your Excellency, I must tell you this to complete the picture, he brought the phone with him and I talked with the President [Jacques Chirac] At the beginning, he started by saying, I want to help you. You are … [INTERRUPTED] Truthfully, I told him in so many words ahhh … what these issues require and what we are now asking. I also told him that we have not met for eleven months; we need to meet so we can provide you with information about Ekeus. He [Ekeus] will not present his report unless you apply pressure against the American pressure, which is the past Italian pressure. I explained other points to him and honestly, without hesitation, he said, “I will give instructions to the Foreign Ministry now to be completely open with you and to exchange and analyze the information, we will help you. We will call to give instructions to our Ambassador in New York to work in complete coordination with you in regards to this specific issue”. When I met with the Prime Minister on the evening of the next day, after my meeting with the Foreign Minister, during the private interview, he said, … I said, I ahhh … I mean, this issue was … I mean, when I met with the Foreign Minister, he was excited, I mean, not bad … [Laughing] … Foreign Minister? This is what we need from you, to pressure Ekeus, scrutinize him, and ask him when he will be finished and to tell him that this is what Iraq has provided, also for your Ambassador in New York to do whatever he is able to do. He told me yes, especially at the time when the Foreign Relations are warm, and the leadership is cold. Now it is the opposite, the situation has been reversed, the leadership is warm, and the Foreign Relations are cold, however, he told me that this has been solved. Chirac met with me today and told me to take the procedures and tell the Minister and the Ambassador and assure them that this issue has been solved. Therefore, the man was sure of his promise over the phone and put the Prime Minister in charge of giving the instructions. The Foreign Minister was friendly and serious at the meeting. We know the Minister, we met him before, however, we reached a level of understanding and he followed the instructions. I mean, at the end, when I was leaving, he assured me of his support, encouraged me, and said, if you are able, even by phone, call me and inform me if anything should happen. I mean, he encourages quick communications. Therefore, if they did not have the will for teamwork and cooperation, I believe, after my visit to Paris, the French position has been restored. […]

Leave a Reply


Clicky Web Analytics