These two desserts look to be pretty much the same thing. And, to the person standing there watching you make these two after dinner delights, it sure looks like you used the same ingredients, mixed the batter, rolled the dough, prepared the apples, you know, the same steps. But, there are subtle nuances that can be found, if one actually takes the time and has the experience, in making these two classic desserts.

The Main Stream Media thinks they understand how the US Military gets troops ready for battle. These are the same scum that miss some glaringly obvious nuances and truly “forked us” in regards to Vietnam.

In this last Sunday’s San Francisco “Comical” (SF Chronicle to those of you that respect this friggin’ rag!), Anna Badkhen, the person that typed the piece of fiction to which I refer, says that the US Military has “cut corners” to get personnel into the field. She asserts that shorter training times and lack of equipment have hurt readiness. One of the choice paragraphs that exposes her lack of understanding follows:

“Soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division had so little time between deployments to Iraq they had to cram more than a year’s worth of training into four months.”

At first blush, one could say, sure, this amount of training time seems a bit too short for someone to go into an operational theater, not to mention the field where every move one makes has consequences. Some of us would say that there are very plausible reasons to have just such a training period. I will hold that assessment until my conclusion. My true intent at the outset is to show just how off the mark these “writers” are when it comes to understanding US Military training and deployment policies, procedures, and ultimately goals and objectives that are more strategic in nature. Or, more appropriately, just what these twits are really up to as they mask their true colors.

The “writer” continues:

“Some had only a few days to learn how to fire their new rifles before they deployed to Iraq - for the third time - last month.”

Now, let’s really look at this statement closely. This is the third time that this particular team, or team member that she spoke with, has been to the battlefield. They had weapons then, obviously, yet this time they have a new weapon. Is the weapon in question such a tectonic departure from their current weapon for their MOS? And I am assuming these individuals are only in the US Army (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry), what if it were a US Marine or US Air Force Security Forces person? C’mon, is this reporterette honestly trying to make me swallow this swill, hook, line and sinker?! Are all the “SF Comical” readers truly that lost that they do not understand weapons training and in-combat experience?

Am I the only one awake, left reading this tripe, and barely able to hold down my breakfast? Well, this gets better, really! Chew on this one:

“And some soldiers were assigned to the brigade so late that they had no time to train in the United States at all. Instead of the yearlong training recommended prior to deployment, they prepared for war during the two weeks they spent in Kuwait, en route to Anbar, Iraq’s deadliest province.”

Again, members of this brigade are on their THIRD ROTATION! Or, am I just missing something she seems to understand as being crucial to the whole picture? Onward:

“As the Pentagon prepares to boost troop levels in Iraq by 21,500 people, such logistical and training hurdles are emblematic of the struggles besieging a military strained by unexpectedly long and grueling commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

I’m trying really hard to stay calm here … really …

You’d think that, based upon the above, we are talking about shortened training time with new weapons, right? Oh no, this little barb sticks out, in a big way:

“After the Cold War, U.S. military [her use of case, not mine] policy - pushed hard by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s policy of “transformation” - relied too much on cutting-edge technology and air power and too little on boots on the ground, and further undercut spending on equipment that would protect large ground forces, critics charge.”

Why do these pinheads always dodge the bullet and say, “critics charge” or “military analysts conclude”? Why isn’t this reporterette making an assertion herself? C’mon have some “gravitas” and make the call yourself! Hiding behind faceless, and often out of context, assertions that are based on several factors, not the one under discussion. But, I digress … these friggin’ chicken-livered, candy-assed, oops … sorry … onward …

Obviously, this writer has no information from which to posit an intelligent conclusion. Just 20 minutes of research on 5th Generation Warfare, and she’d be relatively up to speed on modernization and the efforts being put forth by the US Military - beyond boots on the ground. The only reason that the casualty rate is SO FRIGGIN’ LOW YOU MORON is due to these new, modern, and all encompassing changes to improve the net effective force strength and battlefield control infrastructure.

As to my statement above where I said I’d add a conclusion, well, here goes. Reporters like this Anna Badkhen, in pieces like her 4th of February 2007 piece, “Corners Cut in Rush to Add Troops”, really shows just how lost these people are today. I am struck by the obvious lack of military experience that pervades our printed and video media reports. To just take one point to task, shorter training times are not necessarily bad during war - in fact, they are quite often the smartest decision. By using real world examples (ie on the job training - the hallmark of the US Military!), while riskier, provides training that far surpasses anything you get using fake rounds and a confidence course! And, when you are already skilled with one rifle, how hard is it to get qual’d on a newer one? I know folks that would be splittin’ targets after about 10 minutes of mini-instruction on a new rifle!!! Once you’ve got the sight, feel, weight, balance, and correction for drift, any rifle is just damn deadly - to our enemy. So, THREE WEEKS TO LEARN A NEW RIFLE!?!?!?

Sheesh!

What’s holding us back is stories, and I truly use the word story in reference to this reporter’s piece, and uninformed perspectives that cloud the overall effectiveness of the US Military. We wouldn’t have such a strong insurgency if it weren’t for the cut-N-run crowd and these twits that are very much the lesser of any species trying to grasp what warfare and the US Military are all about.

Anyway, we’re way beyond Apple Crisp and more into apple sauce … what a mess!

If you have the Sunday Comical from 4 February, 2007, maybe you need some bird cage liner?

So, did you get on the Stand-To! mailing list? No? Hmmm … we need to talk.

The US Army has provided the second part of their discussion of battle command. Again, I’ll help those that are asleep at the switch and haven’t seen today’s installment:

“What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future? The Army continues to focus on the synchronization of operations, logistics and intelligence in order to provide Commanders and leaders with the most accurate information needed to conduct combat operations and achieve mission success. The Army will use the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process to field robust Joint Network Battle Command capabilities to the units as they prepare and engage in combat operations. The Army will use these new Joint Networked Battle Command capabilities to leverage information from intelligence, logistics, operations and medical sources, improve analysis, enable greater collaboration, to synchronize efforts quicker and reduce Commander’s decision cycles in the execution of operations to include Force on Force, Stability and Security Operations (SASO) and Counter Insurgency (COINS). The Battle Command systems will connect more soldiers to the network, and provide increased throughput, improve security, enhance collaboration, provide situation awareness, unit readiness status and Command & Control analysis. Battle Command will move toward closer integration with Logistics, including the Movement Tracking System. This system automates tracking of continuous, distributed, and Joint focused logistics across the battle space. Battle Command will also add gateways to US Marine Corps, joint, and coalition tracking systems. As with Blue Force tracker, the result will be a better integrated common operational picture.

Why is this important to the Army? Battle Command is an essential Warfighter Mission Area operational capability for both our current and future joint operations. Joint fully networked Battle Command capabilities will bridge to the Future Force and enable the Joint Force Commander to conduct fully interdependent, network-centric warfare. The Army must continue to work with the Combatant Commanders, Joint Forces Command, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration to identify, align and develop Joint Force capabilities relevant to joint operations. Battle Command will align with Joint ground combat capabilities while simultaneously spiraling in proven Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies.”

Is this approach new to the US Army, or the US Military as a whole? No.

Is there something missing that no matter the good intentions of the US Army and the entire US Military Command Structure, this is all for naught? Yes.

To wage an effective campaign in this 5th Generation Warfare watershed, the media is an integral component to success. Without getting too down on the main stream media (I know, fish in a barrel) an effective holistic campaign can only be waged with communications not just inward but outward. The Milbloggers are behind you and already on board, but multiple media outlets are still not working effectively together with the war. This war on terror is lacking a primary component and we are sacrificing the high ground by not executing in this area.

One can see the net-effect difference by comparing Al Jazeera teamed up with al Qaida and the terrorists currently in the field of battle. In a 5th Generation Warfare command structure, communications between soldiers and communications to the support structure, like the people sacrificing their sons and daughters, results in a highly effective overall campaign. Terrorists have a lock on that, albeit they utilize tactics that should nullify any effort, but theirs works very effectively. We are not to accept or emulate their approach, but it is clear without an outward communications component, all effectiveness is diminished to an unbearable level.

It is a fact that the main stream media is refusing to support our military, our politicians are thrashing to keep their jobs, and the counter-media (Al Jazeera) utilizing propaganda to shift opinion and mold fact to fiction. All of this gives testament to the lack of the US Military’s ability to effectively execute a holistic campaign in the global war on terror. We have technology that dwarfs the competition, yet we cannot use true shock and awe because we all know we’d be set upon by our own media and politicians. It is a given that the European Union is against us, they always will be, so move on, nothing to see here. But the negative energy from within our own boarders is continuously aimed inward thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of waging a true campaign. In the end, it is impossible to be effective in a 5th Generation Warfare watershed until the entire battlefield is conflated. Therefore, our US Military Command Structure needs to gain the high ground on this primary objective, take this last hill and hold it, or we will never be able to effectively field a successful force in battle.

For review, here are my 5GW posts, in order from oldest to newest:

Seems the family has a rift
We Blew Through 4th Generation Warfare!
Boundaries for the Fourth Generation
Clues to the 5th: Shorter Chains?
Yeah, 5GW Means Squat, Right?

Again, any 5GW stuff you find, forward on to me.

Alright, there are a few of us in the blogosphere that follow this crazy stuff. Yeah, I know, we’re like those Area 51-types that see something not really there, just behind that door. And, no, we are NOT all hopped-up on “acid” or “Mary Jane”! Force utilization and the changes and strides made over time are very real, and something that makes some folks just sit up and wanna read more.

Now, when one gets a missive straight from the core area of development in regards to warfare, and the act of prosecuting a war, ya just gotta dig a little bit deeper. This morning, in my regularly scheduled morning memo from the US Army, my inbox gets a jolt! The team at Stand-To! are covering a very germane subject termed battle command. To those of us working and writing about generational warfare, and this aligns with my 5GW posts quite well, their first installment entitled Battle Command - Part One has been posted to those within the US Army command structure - and some of us that read their site and get their daily e-mails.

If you don’t have the time to wander on over to Stand-To!, please take a moment and read their latest sidebar article:

“What is it? Battle Command is the art and science of applying leadership and decision making to achieve mission success. Battle Command leverages technology to achieve information and decision superiority. Battle Command systems enable leaders to gain knowledge to enhance the speed and accuracy of decision making. Battle Command provides Commanders and Leaders with the ability to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.

What has the Army done? Recent combat operations highlight the criticality of beyond line of sight mobile communications, enhanced situation awareness, and synchronization of force application. Battle Command provides improved information systems to make visible actionable information and reduce the cycle time on key commander decisions. The Army has created a better common operational picture with enhancements made to Blue Force Tracking and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). With Joint Intelligence Operations Capability - Iraq (JIOC-I) the Army has integrated and fused intelligence that is relevant and timely within a specific geospatial area of operation for Commander’s and Leaders. Also, the Army has integrated unmanned Aerial Systems and their imagery feeds, and we have added Biometric enhancements to our Human Intelligence (HUMIT) data collection. The Army’s Joint Battle Command network has increased connectivity with JNN, putting more soldiers on the network with higher throughput, so that they are able to push more Command & Control information to Battalion. The Army also has experimented with collaboration tools such as Information Dissemination Management - Tactical (IDM-T) and Command Post of the Future (CPoF), and information systems similar to Combined Information Network Data Exchange (CIDNE) and FusionNet, which provide valuable information to Commanders. The Army has accelerated the fielding of critical Battle Command systems to standardize capabilities, ensuring interoperability of operational and tactical organizations. These capabilities improve joint interdependency as well as horizontal and vertical situational awareness to the platoon level. The Army continues to work with DOD agencies to bring the Joint community closer to a shared common operational picture.”

Now, what interests me very much is the threading together, within the major FBCB2 (Blue Force Tracking and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below), of joint intelligence, information dissemination, and overall coordination within the command structure. This is where I have been leading us all in my 5GW posts. We are doing a better job and have made significant strides in these areas, but how does our use of 5GW differ from those of our enemy? In fact, how much of what we have done is being borrowed, or emulated, by our enemy. My next few posts are now going to be focused on those two very important questions.

For review, here are my 5GW posts, in order from oldest to newest:

Seems the family has a rift
We Blew Through 4th Generation Warfare!
Boundaries for the Fourth Generation
Clues to the 5th: Shorter Chains?

And, please check out as many resources that you can find where this subject, generational warfare, are being written about, and send on to me. I am a major consumer of this subject - a hobby ya might say.

And, no, we’re not talking about snow chains for your car or those hanging swag light chains. The 5th is being marked by something very simple, and I’ll just drop a few breadcrumbs to get ya walkin’ in the right direction:

• JTIDS
• JSTARS
• TADIL
• MC2A
• MOP/DSHTW/Big BLU
• JSF
• JDAM
• HDBTDC Thermobaric Weapon
• Metal Storm
• MOAB
• NLOS
• RJ
• SWF
• UAV/UCAV/JUCAS

In the strategic and tactical execution of warfare, the above have enabled or will produce a tectonic change, uncovering the holy grail of warfare: the Shortened Kill Chain.

Really, the dialectically qualitative change has happened, you just need to read the simple signs. Several of the above I’ve seen on Future Weapons. And a couple of these I’ve had the honor of supporting on active duty. I believe that once you tie all the US Military services’ commands, infrastructure, tools, and weapons together you’ll start to see just how much the change is so very real.

More to come. (how ya doin’ so far, eh?)

UPDATE: added the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SWF) and Direct Strike Hard Target Weapon (DSHTW) as these two truly change the “response” of the enemy on the battlefield. In fact, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the SWF was used and was VERY effective. Oh, and ya can’t leave out the MOAB - she’s got game!

UPDATE 2: added the Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) Thermobaric Weapon, or the BLU-118/B. This is the cave-buster used in Afghanistan that was rushed through development, test, and live fire, to be used live - in less than 67 days (from the woman in charge of the program at Eglin AFB that was interviewed on Future Weapons). Another item to make the enemy, think, before hiding …

To see the beginning of the 5th Generation Warfare watershed we need to define the boundaries of the 4th Generation. Although there are specific cataclysmic events that mark the transition into a new generation, there are several elements of these events that remain true, even in today’s battlefields and training grounds. Mr. Lind dedicates a section of his paper, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, to show how each generation utilizes elements from the past and discards those deemed less effective. In the section, “Elements that Carry Over”, Mr. Lind states:

“Earlier generational shifts, especially the shift from the second to the third generation, were marked by growing emphasis on several central ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the fourth generation, and indeed to expand their influence.”

The four areas that Mr. Lind cites as carrying over are:

1. Utilizing Mission Orders
2. Decreasing dependence on centralized logistics
3. Increasing emphasis on maneuver
4. Collapsing the enemy internally rather than from physical destruction

While it is true that all wars waged by formal states rely heavily on structure utilizing mission orders, centralized logistics, formal maneuvers, and to some extent forcing an internal collapse of the opposition, this fourth area wasn’t truly effective until the 4th Generational Warfare watershed. I submit that this one area, or element, is becoming a very integral part of today’s informal state sponsored wars. And it was honed during the end of the 4th Generation and has displayed a dialectically qualitative change to mark the beginning of the 5th Generation.

Let’s provide an overview of the generational warfare watersheds, using the fourth element as the catalyst that marks the entry into the 4th Generation:

• 1GW :: 1648 to 1918 - smoothbore musket, line and column formations
• 2GW :: 1918 to 1940 - rifled musket, machine gun, indirect fire and movement
• 3GW :: 1940 to 1970 - tanks, blitzkrieg, AC-130, maneuverable agile forces
• 4GW :: 1970 to 2003 - collapse the enemy internally

I believe that the end of the 3rd Generation Warfare watershed was around 1970 when the North Vietnamese first utilized one element or weapon in a new and highly effective manner. This element is the defining moment that marks a significant change in how warfare is prosecuted and signaled the beginning of a more powerful tool marking entry into the 5th Generation. Let me use an example from the 4th Generation to make my point, remembering that this element also carries over to today’s battlefield in a new way. Again, this is only one element or weapon of several that mark the beginning and the end of the 4th Generational Warfare watershed.

In my last post I detailed one of the catalysts that marks the beginning of the 4th Generation watershed. The use of the F-105 and the Shrike missile to destroy the SA-2 missiles supplied to the North Vietnamese by the Russians was a positive turning point in the US Military air campaign. One side effect of the tactics and weapons used to destroy the SA-2 was collateral damage to civilians in local villages. The SA-2, being a rocket loaded with rocket fuel, would explode in an enormous fireball ejecting huge amounts of shrapnel into the surrounding area. The North Vietnamese seized this opportunity, with the help of the Russians, to utilize an old weapon in a new way that was powerful and far reaching. The retooled element that played a pivotal role in the final pullout (defeat) of the US Military was: propaganda.

Propaganda was not new, by any means, in the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th generations. The Russians were very effective utilizing propaganda as a weapon against their enemies and their own people, as well as between their politicians and their military leaders. With the help of the Russians, the North Vietnamese used the media to spin lies that the US Military was purposefully targeting civilians. While this was a lie, the media and all the antiwar protestors (especially Hanoi Jane Fonda) broadcast the lies as fact, or on some occasions an alleged instance (albeit the latter was rare indeed). The successful use of communications and the broadcast media in particular was instrumental, and I posit a huge catalyst, marking the beginning of the 4th Generation Warfare watershed. The fact that images and messages could travel worldwide very quickly, in comparison to say WWII communications, the speed and effectiveness of this lopsided propaganda emasculated the US Military from within - collapse internally - forcing the United States to draw down and finally pull out of Vietnam. And while this incarnation of the use of propaganda is a catalyst triggering a major shift into 4GW, it will take on a new form thereby defining the entry into the 5th Generational Warfare watershed.

The effectiveness of the emasculation of the US Military spread like a plague across the United States. It became commonplace for college students, the media, and politicians to continuously frame the US Military and the United States as being inherently evil, baby killing, corporate raiders, with no compassion and very little regard for the world, the environment, and human beings. The vilification of the United States had begun, and she began to crumble from within under the weight of all the negativism and overt attacks to destroy patriotism. To be a patriot was evil and wrong and unless we became like the USSR, we were doomed to failure. Appeasement began to sweep the country and culminated with the Presidency of Jimmy Carter and the inevitable failure of a man driven by appeasement and lack of fortitude. His orchestration of the failed, and deadly, attempt to rescue the hostages from Iran was clearly a result of the emasculation of a nation - not to mention her military.

Fast forward to 1993 … Laurie nailed it when she said that the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 was a pivotal moment. Even though it took 10 years to perfect, this new element had it’s humble beginnings on that ill fated day in 1993.

The fall of socialism in the USSR, coupled with the quirky end to the 1st Gulf War, signaled to those out to destroy the United States that there was a simple weakness in these large states just waiting to be exploited. There had not been an attack on US soil since December 7th, 1941, at Pearl Harbor. The Middle East was beginning to form new, non-state sponsored, factions driven to destroy Israel. Since the United States supports Israel, and the population is overwhelmingly non-muslim and thereby infidels, these new factions plotted the second attack on US soil: the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

While this attack was unsuccessful in a physically destructive sense, it provides insight into how a burgeoning hate for the United States transformed into an informally coordinated attack. This relatively ad hoc attack had the primary goal of effecting mass destruction within small geographic confines utilizing simple tactics and tools. While communications technology had surged forward at an amazing rate, the architects of the 1993 World Trade Center attack preferred to use only portions of the new technology mixed in with an age old process: person to person communications. With technological advances in listening devices, the attackers knew that as long as they could keep the most secret of information protected, utilizing person to person couriers for written and oral communications, the overall attack would be successful.

The attack was successful in that it gave rise to a new approach of synergizing previously known elements into a central element. This new element, the Neural Attack, would signal the end of the 4th Generation Warfare watershed. The elements that carry forward and later are combined to comprise a Neural Attack are the following:

• Phone, Satellite, TV, Video, Cellular, Radio, and Internet Communications
• Courier and Person to Person (written and Oral) Communications
• Propaganda and Information-based Attacks
• Stealth Aircraft and FAF Munitions (fire and forget)
• Integrated Strategic/Tactical Communications Technologies and Protocols (JTIDS/JSTARS, etc)
• Joint Forces Command Structure and Operations

While the above do not, in any way, enumerate all the elements available, they do constitute a fairly broad list with which a successful Neural Attack can be formed. Once several Neural Attacks are combined to form a Neural Attack Battle Plan, a dialectically qualitative change can be seen. I submit that a battle plan of this type was formed and executed in the 2nd Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom, marking the end of the 4th Generation Warfare watershed and propelling us all into 5th Generation Warfare.

With the advent of the Neural Attack, here is the new generational warfare timeline:

As you can see, from the 2nd Generation to today, each major change has been roughly 30 years apart. While technology plows ahead at amazing rates of change, warfare and the art of war progresses at a relatively even pace. Several questions came to mind while I was preparing this post. And one observation was very unsettling: does everyone think I’ve made this all up and spaced things evenly? But, to truly have a dialectically qualitative change one must be engaged in formal war. The 1st Gulf War was more of a police operation because the US and Coalition forces did NOT push through to the final result, a true war. Once Iraq was moved back into and within her own borders, the US Military began to stand down. Another contributing factor was “The Road to Basra” which proved the US Military’s effectiveness at executing a Neural Attack on a small scale. This also resulted in more propaganda than President George H.W. Bush was ready to endure, thereby giving us a “quirky” end to the 1st Gulf War.

In the next series of posts, I’ll lay out what I see are the elements that comprise a 5GW Neural Attack and Battle Plan that resulted in successfully capturing Baghdad: Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Did ya miss it? Huh?

To truly grasp why I posit that we’ve blown through 4th Generation Warfare, and have already entered 5th Generation Warfare, one must understand the periods that comprise 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare. It is key that we understand what comprises a transition, or in fact the watersheds William S. Lind describes in “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”. Mr. Lind’s report, filed with the US Marine Corps in the Marine Corps Gazette some 17 years ago, has been a primary resource for those that dabble in “generational warfare” speeches, theories, papers, and books. In one simple statement Mr. Lind provides the definition for these generations:

“While military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations.”

Now, when Mr. Lind wrote this initial report for the US Marine Corps, back in October of 1989, warfare was very different from today. In fact, some may even say that they have not seen a change in the way the US Military fights today than say, WWII or even in The Korean War. But on closer inspection, I say that there has already been one more watershed added - the 4th Generation is clearly marked and we are now into the 5th Generation. Again, as stated above by Mr. Lind, the catalysts for change are key when transitioning from one generation to the next.

Looking at a timeline of the first three generations, you can see that the shortest transitions have taken place around WWI (1914 - 1919) and WWII (1939 - 1945), as pictured here:

It is very important to note that Mr. Lind has stated that the basic concepts of 3rd Generation Warfare tactics were in place by the end of 1918. What is written as the primary catalyst defining the entrance into 3rd Generation is a new technology and the tactics that are a direct result of that new technology: tanks and the blitzkrieg. Therefore the 3rd Generation owes its very existence to the tank and blitzkrieg. You can learn all about these watersheds in the first page and a half of Mr. Lind’s paper. The last three and a half pages carefully postulate what could comprise the 4th Generation’s watershed, as if it is something that is in the future - or near future. I posit that it is actually in our past, and that we’ve blown through the 4th Generation and have already entered the 5th Generation based upon the above guidelines for what makes a generational shift possible, a huge catalyst.

There were huge changes after the Korean War and into and through Vietnam that, to me, are incontrovertible evidence that the 4th Generation happened and we find ourselves smack dab in the middle of the 5th Generation. I’ll give you the two that come quickly to mind for me, and that is mainly ’cause I’m ex-USAF and these two birds show a clear shift in technology and tactics.

The first example can trace it’s birth to the need for close air support and directed strikes in rough terrain: the AC-130 Spectre (the younger sister of Spooky, the AC-47). The AC-47 Spooky, a rework of the C-47 Skytrain, had guns that could destroy targets from the air, but she lacked the range, and effectiveness, that the field commanders required. Later, in 1968, the US Air Force put the first AC-130 Spectre into action - and she performed beyond expectation! The growing relationship between ground troops and the AC-130 became paramount to the success of ground operations. The AC-130 afforded small squads the opportunity to call in close support in terrain that in the past would have been impossible. The AC-130 flew in, taking direction from the squad leader or officer on the ground, with pinpoint accuracy. By eliminating the enemy without directly engaging them reduced casualties. Plus, with the advent of even newer and more accurate weapons’ delivery systems, the AC-130 became the best friend for anyone pinned down during a firefight.

The second example is the grandfather to a maneuver that has changed the way of the air campaign: the F-105 Wild Weasel (older brother to the F-4 Wild Weasel, well all wild weasels!). The bane of every attacking wave of US Navy and US Air Force fighter/bomber pilot is the Russian made SA-2 rocket. Sorties into North Vietnam were tough with just having to put up with AAA fire, now pilots had to deal with this ground missile guided by ground based, mobile, radar trucks. The threat needed to be eliminated, and new technology and tactics developed for the F-105 allowed pilots to fly ahead of and behind those fighter/bomber sorties, eliminating the radar systems, either by scaring them into going dark or blowing them up on very dangerous, “down the beam” attacks. Once the AGM-45 missile was developed for the F-105 and RF-4, SA-2 sites no longer had a chance.

These two examples, in my estimation, are evidence that huge catalysts in technology and tactics provide the 4th’s watershed, the beginning and the end. The reason that I posit that there is an end to the 4th and an entrance into the 5th is, well, read on.

Several pundits and authors have presented their analysis that states, and I’ll generalize here, that there are multiple elements considered when categorizing these generational warfare bands or eras (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th). Most often spoken of today is technology and tactics that make up the 4th Generation. This is due, primarily, to the fact that we all are using a body of work that is 17 years old and that our thinking has stopped there, in 1989. In a few places that I have gone to, and these are not the only sites, Small Wars Council, ZenPundit, and Dreaming 5GW, I have found excellent cross references from which to conclude we can see the 4th Generation’s watershed, and that the 5th’s is very current, and very real. But until now, I have not seen what I believe is a real world example of this 5th Generation’s existence. But by enumerating several, and not all, of the primary elements I see as the delivery mechanisms, varying devices or munitions, the locales or targets, and the tactics or methods employed in 5th Generation Warfare taking place today, I think that you will begin to see just what I mean.

I believe that a 5GW warrior or strategist utilizes several, and sometimes all, of these elements, interchanging and combining them in a very hyper-frenetic fashion to create weapons and tactics in a dynamic, and extremely lethal, attack. This new process is the catalyst, or the dialectically qualitative change, that Mr. Lind tells us defines each watershed - our 5th Generation Warfare watershed. Just take this list in for a moment:

Information Sources

• Internet / Communications / Face-to-Face
• Battle Plans / Objectives
• SitReps / JTIDS / Sensors
• Media
• Folklore
• Factual History

Influences

• Religion / Belief System / Morality / Ethics
• Government / Rule / Politics
• Academia / Instruction / Literacy
• Economics / Resources
• Media
• Folklore
• Factual History

Geographical / Physical

• Battlefield / Theater
• Village / Town / City / Province|County / State / Country / Continent

Technological / Virtual

• Websites / Blogs / Forums / Feeds
• E-mail / Listservs
• Land line
• Radio
• TV
• Video

Current Examples

• Guerrilla / Militia / Gangs / Dictators
• Propaganda / Political Correctness / Appeasement
• Terrorism / Hijacking / Hostages
• Hysteria / Riots / Mass Killings
• Oppression / Rape / Looting & Robbery

In actuality, I believe that these are the tools or weapons with which a 5GW campaign is being executed today. I am sure, as you review these, you might begin to build your own combinations and see that there are some very clear, and cataclysmic, examples taking place today. And these combo-catalysts are reshaping and redefining the battlefield at an alarming rate, while at the same time making the battlefield more mobile and at the same time more difficult to conquer.

This new generation, the 5th Generation Warfare and Warrior, is no friggin’ goof with an SA-2, people. It is real, and it has been here already, and it is taking root in places you would never expect or imagine. I am not a conspiracy theorist or whack-nut psycho trying to get extra hits to my blog or boost ad revenue. I am a concerned, ex-USAF, US Citizen that sees a new wave that our US Military is not prepared to fight. And we need a wake-up call that is not rooted in old, stodgy, and myopic views of warfare. The new generation, the 5th GWW (generation warfare warrior), is betting you’ll keep your noses in those books, old training manuals, and stay in clearly formed columns and squads acting in concert to central commands.

They’re betting on it.

I’ll provide the entrance criteria for the 5th Generation Warfare watershed in my next post. Here’s a hint: sniff around 2003, using 1993 as a point of reference for the initial signs of change. And drop your freak-theories about wars for oil and nukes - it is simpler and more dangerous.

Have FUN!

I have been doing a ton of reading lately. 5GW (5th Generation Warfare) has sparked a renewed interest in all things military and the approach to warfare. OK, I never really left that path, but work with me here.

As I was working my way deeper into this subject, I have found that I deviate, severely, from what has been the most authoritative work on the generations of warfare. I cannot say that this work is the only resource. However, I can say that most folks I have chatted with regarding subject of warfare through four distinct generations, base their root analysis on Mr. Lind’s work. I’ve been working through what I see in today’s warfare, based on my experiences within the USAF and the missions I was a part, and I think I am seeing a path not well traveled.

That said, I have to say, my posts have been very few lately! I think that there are a few more things to research, but it seems from this toil there are going to be several posts dedicated to this subject.

Therefore, I’m gonna post something new, right after this post, that is a tad bit more lighthearted to get back into the bloggin’ rhythm … OK?

Many posts ago I was reviewing the new direction(s) of the US Military and BRAC. It is interesting to see how our military adjusts to the enemy, the environment(s) in which we fight, the emboldening support we get countered by the derision we face, and the tools we employ to get the job done.

I’ve been reading up on 5GW. It is not a new form of wireless protocol to improve your cell phone reception or stop the dreaded dropped call. 5GW is Fifth Generation Warfare, and it is a subject that, to me, is near Schrodinger-like! I have been diving in to learn as much as possible. I have seen so many clues, or waypoints, that bode a shift in today’s wars - as well as for future wars.

I’ll be posting regarding my findings … hopefully they’ll interest you. But, be prepared and forewarned - if neural networks do not interest you, you might wanna skip my 5GW posts.